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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Mrs. Nielsen's complaint on
summary judgment where there were material issues of fact in dispute regarding (1) whether the
adjuster for the insurer of Ms. Heffron (all collectively referred to herein as "Liberty Mutual")
represented to Mrs. Nielsen or her counsel that the "personal injury" language in the release
would not be binding on Mrs. Nielsen thereby precluding use of the release due to estoppel or
fraud in the inducement; and (2) whether an employee or agent of Liberty Mutual physically
altered the release, making it void and fraudulent.
Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
challenge to summary judgment involves only review of questions of law in which the appellate
court reviews the questions for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions.
The appellate court addresses (1) whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and
(2) whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.
Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince, 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Her
Complaint and attachments thereto, R. 43 to 51, and in oral argument before the trial court, R.
123, T. 14-23.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Nielsen's motion for leave to
1

amend her complaint where (1) justice clearly required the granting of the motion, (2) there
would be no prejudice to the defendants, and (3) the issues involved in the proposed amendment
related directly to the validity of the release.
Standard of review: A ruling on a motion to amend is within the discretion of the trial
court. Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993). Where the trial court exercises its
discretion, it may be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262,
265 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Her
Complaint and attachments thereto, R. 43 to 51.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions governing the resolution
of these issues. Issue No. 2 is governed by Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. which provides that leave
to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action by Vickie M. Nielsen which arose as a result of an
automobile accident on September 28, 1990. Negotiations with Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, the Defendant's insurer, began in February of 1991. On May 1, 1991, Liberty Mutual
paid Mrs. Nielsen's husband for loss of his pickup truck in exchange for title to the vehicle. On
or about June 6, 1991, David Gehris, adjuster for Liberty Mutual, negotiated a settlement for
Mrs. Nielsen's separate property damage claim. He sent a release to be executed by Mrs. Nielsen
and her counsel. Mr. Gehris advised Mrs. Nielsen's attorney that he knew the settlement was
only with respect to Mrs. Nielsen's property damage claim and that they could ignore language
2

in the release regarding personal injury claims. Not wishing to rely solely on Mr. Gehris' oral
representation, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel crossed out on the release the words "Personal Injuries
existing or which may exist which are known or unknown to me at the present time" and "both to
person." Both then executed the release.
On December 15, 1992, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel contacted Mr. Gehris concerning Mrs.
Nielsen's back injury resulting from the accident and discussed her pending surgery. On August
24, 1993, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel again contracted Mr. Gehris regarding the expenses for the
surgery. On September 21, 1993, Mrs. Nielsen's attorney received a letter from Mr. Gehris
requesting that he be contacted regarding the personal injury claim. On October 5, 1993 Mrs.
Nielsen's counsel sent a medical records package to Mr. Gehris and requested that he respond
concerning an independent medical examination. Litigation was timely commenced on
September 20, 1994.
Mrs. Nielsen's counsel subsequently corresponded with Liberty Mutual personnel
regarding the personal injury claim and both parties engaged in discovery. Not until Liberty
Mutual filed its motion to dismiss on or about October 28, 1997, three years after
commencement of the action, did Liberty Mutual produce the release and assert that the release
precluded Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims.
Liberty Mutual submitted with its motion an affidavit of Mr. Gehris. Mrs. Nielsen
responded with documentary evidence, her own affidavit and an affidavit of her attorney.1 She
also filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to allege fraud and alteration of the release.
The trial court ruled that the Best Evidence Rule governed the issue and interpreted the

lr

The motion is, therefore, properly treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56, Utah R. Civ. P. See Rule 12(b), Utah R. Civ. P.
3

release without resort to extrinsic evidence. It ordered Mrs. Nielsen's claims dismissed with
prejudice. Without entertaining oral argument on Mrs. Nielsen's motion for leave to amend and
without making any findings as to that motion, the trial court denied her motion.
This appeal has been brought to challenge the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Nielsen's
claims and its denial of her motion to amend.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On September 23, 1990, Vickie Nielsen was injured in a traffic accident involving a
vehicle operated by Mary Jane Hefferon. R. 2.
2. Subsequent to the accident, Mrs. Nielsen obtained counsel who negotiated a
settlement with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, insurer of the vehicle operated by Mary
Jane Hefferon. R. 44.
3. In May of 1991, Liberty Mutual settled the claim of Mrs. Nielsen's husband for loss of
his pickup truck. R. 44.
4. Subsequent to the May 1991 settlement, Mrs. Nielsen negotiated and settled her
separate claim for property damage. R. 45.
5. Liberty Mutual's claims adjuster, David Gehris, sent Mrs. Nielsen a release form to
execute prior to receipt of the property damage amount. The adjuster represented to Mrs.
Nielsen's counsel that the settlement was solely for the property damage and that Mrs. Nielsen
could "ignore" the language regarding personal injury. R. 45.
6. Mrs. Nielsen did not trust the insurance company or Mr. Gehris. As a result, her
counsel crossed out the words "Personal injuries existing or which may exist which are known or
unknown to me at the present time" and "both to person." R. 45.
7. Mrs. Nielsen executed the release agreement with the personal injury language struck
4

out. R. 45.
8. Both Mrs. Nielsen and Mr. Gehris understood that Mrs. Nielsen would be asserting a
claim for personal injuries after she underwent the necessary extensive medical treatment. R. 46.
9. From December 1992 through September of 1994, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel contacted
and corresponded with Mr. Gehris concerning Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims. R. 46 to
47.
10. Mrs. Nielsen commenced this action on September 20, 1994. R. 1.
11. After commencement of the action, Mrs. Nielsen cooperated with Liberty Mutual in
the evaluation of her personal injury claims. R. 46 to 47.
12. Both parties engaged in extensive discovery. At no time during discovery did
Liberty Mutual produce the release nor assert reliance on the release as an affirmative defense.
13. In August of 1997, Liberty Mutual "found" the release. R. 34.
14. On October 28, 1997, Liberty Mutual filed (1) a motion for leave to amend its answer
to assert the release as an affirmative defense, and (2) a motion to dismiss. R. 38.
15. On November 13, 1997, Mrs. Nielsen filed an objection to Liberty Mutual's motions
and a motion for leave to amend her complaint to assert her claims of fraud and bad faith of the
release and her defenses to the release. R. 40.
16. With her memoranda, Mrs. Nielsen filed her affidavit and an affidavit of her counsel
raising material factual issues about the validity and enforceability of the release. R. 52 to 82.
17. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions on February 26, 1998. R. 123
(see transcript).
18. At the hearing, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel inspected the release and acknowledged the
validity of the signatures. R. 113.
5

19. The trial court then relied on the best evidence rule to hold that the scope of the
agreement must be determined from the face of the release. R. 113. Finding no ambiguity in the
language of the release, the court refused to consider parol evidence and held that the release
precluded Mrs. Nielsen's claims. R. 114.
20. At no time did the trial court evaluate Mrs. Nielsen's claims of fraud, alteration, or
fraud in the inducement.
21. Without discussion or analysis, the trial court denied Mrs. Nielsen's motion to amend
her complaint. R. 114.
22. The trial court dismissed Mrs. Nielsen's claims with prejudice. R. 114.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Factual issues which are material are
those which affect the final determination of legal issues under the appropriate governing law. In
the present case, the legal issue is whether the release produced by Liberty Mutual is valid and
bars Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims.
A release, like any other agreement, is construed according to its terms from the face of
the agreement except in cases where facts exist which would invalidate the agreement. A release
which limits or waives liability is unenforceable if procured by fraud or entered into on
reasonable reliance upon the positive assertions made by another. In addition, a contract which
has been altered is invalid. Where the question of alteration has been raised, the issue is a fact
question which must be presented to the trier of fact and may not be disposed of by summary
judgment. Where a document has been submitted which appears regular on its face, the trial
court or finder of fact may not presume the document to be valid in the face of an assertion that
6

the document was altered or that the agreement was fraudulently induced.
Mrs. Nielsen did not allege fraud in her earlier pleadings because there was no indication
that Liberty Mutual was going to assert the release as a defense to her claims. Only when the
release was later found and Liberty Mutual asserted it as an affirmative defense, did Mrs. Nielsen
have to evaluate the fraud issues. She did so timely through her objection to Liberty Mutual's
motion to dismiss and by motion to the court for leave to amend her complaint.
The trial court's dismissal in the face of disputed issues of material fact was erroneous as
a matter of law. In addition, its denial of Mrs. Nielsen's motion to amend was an abuse of
discretion which resulted in prejudice and substantial injustice to Mrs. Nielsen. This Court
should, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE
DISPUTED FACTS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE
RELEASE.
It is well-established law that a trial court may properly grant summary judgment only in
the absence of genuine issues of material fact where the moving party is entitled to judgment on
the undisputed facts as a matter of law. E.g., Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince. 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10
(Utah 1998). This Court has stated in the context of a summary judgment motion that an issue of
fact "must be material to the applicable rule of law." Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859
(Utah 1983). It has not defined "materiality" in the summary judgment context. It has, however,
j

indicated in a criminal matter that the measure of materiality is the effect of a fact on the
outcome of a trial. State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 1985) ("Testimony is material. .
7

. if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial.") The
U.S. Supreme Court has defined the terms "material" and "genuine" for summary judgment
purposes. A "material" fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law," and a "genuine" issue is one for which "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Many states have similarly defined a fact as being
material for summary judgment purposes if it can affect the determination of the legal issues, i.e.,
the outcome of the case.2
The legal issue before the trial court on summary judgment was whether the release
signed by Mrs. Nielsen, which contained language releasing liability for personal injury, was
valid and enforceable. The trial court relied on the "best evidence rule" to the exclusion of parol
evidence to conclude that the release was valid and enforceable.
This Court has recognized that parol evidence is properly received where an agreement
may be invalid for fraud or other causes.
This court has held that as a principle of contract interpretation, the
parol evidence rule has only a narrow application. Simply stated,
the rule operates, in the absence of invalidating causes such as
fraud or illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract.
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted,
emphasis added). See also State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsev. 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977)
(presumption that writing is integrated is appropriate "in the absence of invalidating causes such

2

E.g., Beck v. Haines Terminal & Highway Co.. 843 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992); Peterson v. Halsted. 829
P.2d 373, 375 (Colo. 1992); Drake v. Drake. 586 P.2d 742, 743 (Okla. 1978); Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co..
850 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Wash. 1993); Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist.. 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997).
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as fraud or illegality"); Lamb v. Bangart. 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974) ("unless fraud, accident
or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties").
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts addresses the issue of when parol evidence may
be admissible in the evaluation of a facially complete agreement.
Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish
(a) that the writing is not an integrated agreement;
(b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or
partially integrated;
(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated;
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration,
or other invalidating cause;
(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation,
specific performance, or other remedy.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 (1981). Two of the Restatement comments are relevant
to the present issue.
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement
may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement without
consideration, or it may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or
the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and
commonly do not appear on the face of the writing.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 comment c.
A contract which is fully enforceable in an action for damages may
be subject to equitable remedies such as rescission or reformation
by reason of fraud, mistake or the like. . . . Evidence of the
circumstances in which the contract was made may be relevant to
such remedial issues . . .
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 comment d.
Under Utah law, an agreement which limits liability, such as the release at issue here, is
unenforceable if it is procured by fraud. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists,
Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Lamb v. Bangart. 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah
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1974)). See also Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Duean v.
Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), "A person may rely upon positive assertions made by
another, and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid the contract.")
It is also Utah law that a challenge to the validity of a document based on alteration is a
fact question which must go to the finder of fact. "[T]he question of [a document's] validity is a
matter to be determined by the trier of fact, and the mere fact that a judge allows a document to
be received in evidence does not mean that the jury or the court, if there is no jury, must accept
the document as genuine." Hartman v. Young. 551 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1976). See also Zions
First Nat. Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr.. Inc.. 795 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990) ("The trial court
should have allowed the jury to decide the material, fraudulent alteration issue.") Parol evidence
is admissible in evaluating the alteration issue.
[I]f the genuineness or authenticity of a material expression is in
question, the parol evidence rule does not come into play;
otherwise, it would be a means of destroying all defenses of a
forgery victim and making a false document genuine, simply by
silencing the person who most clearly knows of its falsity.
Tates. Inc. v. Salisbury. 795 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Utah App. 1990). The existence of this fact
question as to the alteration of the release, on which parol evidence is properly admissible,
clearly precludes summary judgment on the validity of the document.
After it became apparent that Liberty Mutual intended to rely on its newly located
release, Mrs. Nielsen discovered that the release did not reflect changes she made at the time she
signed it, She subsequently filed a motion to amend her complaint to allege fraudulent alteration
of the release.
In addition, in response to Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss, Mrs. Nielsen submitted her
affidavit and that of her counsel which clearly raise issues of fact material to the validity and
10

enforceability of the release. Mrs. Nielsen's affidavit stated, in part:
6. Under no condition did I settle my personal injury claim
in June of 1991 knowing the extent of my injuries. I told my
attorney that I did not trust insurance companies and I would not
sign the release unless we modified the document.
7. When the Release and Settlement agreement was signed
on June 6, 1991 in my attorney's office, I specifically asked him to
cross out the words "Personal Injuries existing or which may exist
which are known or unknown to me at the present time" and "both
to person."
8. The agreement that the Defendants have submitted is not
a true nor a correct copy of the original that was signed by me and
sent to the insurance company by my attorney.
Affidavit of Vickie M. Nielsen, R. 53. The affidavit of Mrs. Nielsen's attorney also establishes
fact questions about the intent of the parties in executing the release and raises questions about
whether the release had been altered. Affidavit of Paul M. Halliday, Jr. R. 56.
Mrs. Nielsen raised factual issues about the circumstances surrounding her execution of
the release which would preclude the written agreement from being an integration or a statement
j

of her intent. She also raised factual issues about the facial validity of the release, in particular
whether it had been altered after she signed it. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in
reliance on the best evidence rule despite the existence of these material issues of fact was
erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING MRS. NIELSEN LEAVE TO AMEND HER
COMPLAINT.
The decision of whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the discretion of

11

the trial court. E.g., Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993). Rule 15(a), Utah R.
Civ. P. provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." This
Court has interpreted this provision liberally to "afford parties 'the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.'" Wilcox v. Geneva Rock
Corp.. 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). A denial of a motion to amend is an
abuse of discretion if it results in prejudice to the moving party. Slattery v. Covev & Co., Inc..
857 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). There are three considerations which the
appellate court views in evaluating on a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend: "(1) the
timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason for the delay; and (3) the resulting
prejudice to the responding party." Swift Stop. Inc. v. Wight. 845 P.2d 250, 258 (Utah App.
1992) (citing Westlev v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983)). A motion to
amend made well into the discovery process "should be allowed if there is reasonable
explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to
the opposing party." Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Girard v.
Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983)).
Mrs. Nielsen commenced this action on September 20, 1994. The parties engaged in
extensive discovery. At no time did Liberty Mutual produce the release. In August of 1997,
Liberty Mutual "found" the release and subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend its
answer and a motion to dismiss based upon the release (October 28, 1997). Based upon the
recollection of Mrs. Nielsen and her attorney that the personal injury provisions had been lined
out, Mrs. Nielsen made her motion to the court on November 13, 1997, for leave to amend her
complaint to raise the issue of fraudulent alteration of the release.
At no time prior to the hearing before the trial court on February 26, 1998 was Mrs.
12

Lynn S. Davies [A0824]
Kent W. Hansen [A6560]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

av

ny > ~ vm
°"
'" ***
<
o'' ^S7Z^
...L^r^^'--^
{
^r

IN THF r>T<sTRTrT rnTTPT nv THE THIRD FTPTTAT. DTCTRTCT
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VICKIE M. NIELSEN,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
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Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on February 26, 1998 pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendant, the Estate of Mary Jane HefFeron, and the Motion to Amend Complaint filed
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Having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, including the motions and
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the present motions, and good cause

appearing therefore, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At the hearing held in this matter, Defendant's counsel produced an original

Release and Settlement of Claim (the "Original Release"). Exhibit "A" attached to Defendant's
Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Dismiss appears to the Court to be a duplicate of the
Original Release.
2.

At that hearing, after having inspected the Original Release and conferred with

Plaintiff, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledged that the signatures on the Original Release are the
signatures of Plaintiff and her counsel.
3.

Also at that hearing, Plaintiffs counsel stated that there was only one original of

the Release and Settlement of Claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under the Best Evidence Rule, set forth at Rules 1002-1004, Utah Rules of

Evidence, where the Original Release is available and before the Court, Plaintiffs counsel
having acknowledged that the Original Release bears the signatures of Plaintiff and her counsel,
the content and scope of the parties' agreement must be determined from the Original Release.
2.

After having considered all of the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court finds

that there is no ambiguity with regard to the language of the Original Release. Accordingly, the

2

parties' intent must be ascertained solelyfromthe language of this contract, without resort to
parole evidence.
3.

The Original Release clearly encompasses Plaintiff's claims for personal injuries

arisingfromthe accident that is the subject of this accident, which are the same claims asserted
in this action.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim is dismissed with
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff s Motion to Amend her
Complaint is denied.
DATED this 7 - r day of

j vv^-L,

, 1998.

BYTHECOURT:

J

u
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The Honorable Judge ^ i
Third District C o u r t ^

Approved as to Form:
HALLIDAY & WATKINS

Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERT1I l< A l l ' HI SK.IU l( I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 3r4 day of <HT\dLt,ohs
\998, to the
following:
Paul M. Halliday, Jr.
Paul M. Halliday
HALLIDAY & WATKINS
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

y

/LtJ/l^i^

8871-363: 188026
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